BRICS 2026: From an Economic Idea to a Global Power Test

BRICS began with a relatively simple idea: major emerging economies needed a stronger collective voice in a global system largely shaped by established Western institutions.

The term BRIC was coined by economist Jim O'Neill in 2001 to describe Brazil, Russia, India and China as major emerging economies. The governments gradually turned that economic concept into a diplomatic platform, with the first foreign-ministers meeting taking place in 2006 and the first leaders' summit held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009.

South Africa later joined the grouping, transforming BRIC into BRICS. It was invited in December 2010 and attended its first summit as a member in April 2011.

For India, BRICS has always represented more than economic cooperation.

It has been a platform through which New Delhi could work simultaneously with Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa while maintaining its own strategic autonomy.

Over time, the agenda expanded from trade and economic cooperation to development finance, global governance, climate change, health, technology, agriculture and other areas of international cooperation.

The creation of the New Development Bank was one of the most significant institutional developments associated with BRICS. It reflected an ambition to provide additional development-financing options for emerging economies rather than relying exclusively on existing international financial institutions.

But BRICS has never been a conventional alliance.

Its members have different political systems, economic structures and foreign-policy priorities. India and China remain strategic competitors. Russia's relationship with Western countries has dramatically changed the geopolitical environment. Brazil has traditionally maintained a different diplomatic orientation from Moscow or Beijing.

That diversity has always been both BRICS' strength and its weakness.

From BRIC to an Expanded BRICS

The biggest transformation came with expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined the grouping in 2024, while Indonesia became a member in 2025. This transformed BRICS from the original five-member grouping into a much larger platform spanning Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The expansion changed the basic question surrounding BRICS.

Earlier, the debate was about whether five emerging economies could influence global governance.

Today, the question is whether a much larger and more diverse group can actually agree on what it wants to achieve. The enlarged BRICS represents a significant portion of the world's population and global economic activity. That gives the grouping considerable diplomatic weight.But numbers alone do not create influence.A larger organisation can also become harder to coordinate.

The India Factor

India's role is particularly important because New Delhi does not approach BRICS as an anti-Western alliance. India maintains relationships across competing geopolitical groupings. It works with BRICS, the G20, the Quad, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and other platforms while pursuing its own national interests.

That makes India's BRICS presidency different from an attempt to create a new geopolitical bloc. For New Delhi, the opportunity is to make BRICS more results-oriented.

The question is whether the grouping can move beyond broad declarations and deliver measurable cooperation in areas that affect ordinary economies — trade, supply chains, infrastructure, technology, development finance, energy security and digital systems.

That is also why the 2026 summit matters.

Why 2026 Is Different

The 2026 BRICS summit comes at a particularly difficult geopolitical moment.

The expanded membership includes countries with sharply different positions on major international conflicts. The ongoing Iran conflict has created an especially difficult situation for BRICS because Iran and the UAE are both members but now occupy opposing positions in the crisis. Recent BRICS ministerial discussions have already shown how difficult consensus can become.

This presents India with a complicated diplomatic task. New Delhi must maintain its relationships with Russia, China, Iran and the UAE while trying to keep the larger BRICS platform functional.

That is not easy diplomacy.

But it is precisely here that India's traditional approach of strategic autonomy becomes important.

BRICS and the Question of the Dollar

One of the most discussed issues surrounding BRICS has been the possibility of reducing dependence on the US dollar. Some members have openly discussed alternatives to the existing global financial architecture.

But there is a difference between reducing excessive dependence on a single currency and creating a replacement for the dollar.

The second would require enormous financial integration, deep capital markets, monetary stability and trust among countries whose economic systems are very different.

India therefore has an opportunity to push for financial cooperation based on practical needs rather than turning BRICS into a purely geopolitical campaign against the dollar.Local-currency trade, easier cross-border payments and stronger development financing could be more realistic areas of progress.

The Real Economic Opportunity

BRICS' future may ultimately be decided less by political speeches and more by whether businesses and citizens see tangible benefits.

Supply-chain cooperation could reduce vulnerabilities. Better logistics could lower trade costs. Digital-payment cooperation could make cross-border transactions easier. Development-finance mechanisms could support infrastructure. Technology partnerships could help emerging economies build domestic capabilities.

At the 2026 summit, proposals including a BRICS Incubator Network, a Startup Innovation Fund and a logistics and supply-chain cooperation framework are among the initiatives being discussed.

If these ideas become operational rather than remaining declarations, BRICS could develop a more results-oriented identity.

But BRICS Has a Problem: Consensus

The larger BRICS becomes, the more difficult consensus can become.

The original members already had significant differences. Expansion has added countries with their own regional disputes, economic interests and strategic priorities.

That means BRICS cannot assume that every member will support every geopolitical position. The group may therefore need to accept that cooperation does not require complete political agreement.

Trade cooperation can continue despite political differences.

Development projects can continue despite diplomatic disagreements.

Technology cooperation can continue even when countries disagree on international conflicts.

This could actually become BRICS' greatest strength. Instead of trying to become another military or ideological alliance, BRICS could establish itself as a platform where countries with different political positions can still cooperate on common economic interests.

What BRICS Has Already Changed

BRICS has already changed the conversation about global governance.

For years, major international financial and political institutions were largely shaped around Western power structures.

BRICS has contributed to a wider argument: emerging economies should have a larger role in deciding how global finance, development and international institutions operate. Whether every BRICS proposal succeeds is a separate question. The significance lies partly in the fact that the demand for greater representation has become difficult to ignore.

The G7 Comparison Is Not Enough

BRICS is increasingly compared with the G7. But the comparison can be misleading. The G7 consists of relatively advanced economies with broadly similar political and economic systems. BRICS is much more diverse.

Its members differ dramatically in income levels, political structures, strategic priorities and international alignments.

Therefore, BRICS does not need to become a "Global South G7".

Its value may lie precisely in being different. Its challenge is to turn that diversity from a weakness into a functioning model of cooperation.

India's Real Test

For India, hosting BRICS is not simply about bringing world leaders to New Delhi. It is an opportunity to demonstrate whether India can help manage a complex multilateral organisation without allowing it to become paralysed by geopolitical differences.

India's diplomatic challenge is to keep the focus on cooperation while acknowledging disagreements rather than pretending they do not exist.

A successful BRICS presidency should therefore not be measured only by the language of a joint declaration.

It should be measured by what happens after the summit.

• Do projects move forward?
• Do businesses gain easier access to markets?
• Do financial links become stronger?
• Does technology cooperation improve?
• Does development financing become more accessible?
• Does the Global South gain a more effective voice?

These are harder questions than producing a summit statement.

They are also more important.

What BRICS Could Become

BRICS does not need to become a replacement for the United Nations, G7 or existing global institutions. Nor does it need to become an anti-American or anti-Western alliance.

Its strongest future may lie somewhere between those extremes. It can become a coalition of major emerging and developing economies that cooperate where interests overlap while allowing members to maintain independent foreign policies.

That model would also suit India's strategic outlook.A world divided into rigid camps creates pressure on countries to choose sides.

A world with multiple platforms allows countries to negotiate, cooperate and protect their national interests simultaneously.

BRICS can contribute to that multipolar world — but only if it remains functional.

NationPath Editorial View

BRICS has become too large and too important to be judged simply by the number of countries sitting around its table.

Its real test is effectiveness. The history of BRICS shows a gradual transformation — from an economic acronym created to describe emerging markets, to a diplomatic grouping, to an institution with development-finance ambitions, and now to an expanded platform representing a much broader part of the Global South.

But expansion also creates responsibility. BRICS now has to prove that wider representation can produce tangible outcomes rather than simply create a larger diplomatic forum.

India's challenge in 2026 is therefore not to make BRICS louder. It is to make BRICS more useful. If the grouping can produce stronger trade links, better financial cooperation, resilient supply chains, technology partnerships and meaningful development initiatives, its expansion will have purpose.

If it becomes primarily a forum for competing geopolitical statements, its growing size could become its greatest weakness. The future of BRICS will not be decided by its acronym. It will be decided by whether its members can find enough common ground to turn collective weight into collective action.

And for India, that is the real opportunity of 2026.

The Final Question

BRICS began with four emerging economies asking for a stronger voice.

Today, it represents a much wider and more complicated coalition.

The question has therefore changed.

It is no longer simply:

Can emerging economies challenge the existing global order?

The more important question is:

Can they build something effective together without first becoming politically identical?

If BRICS can answer that question, its next chapter could be far more important than its first. If it cannot, expansion may remain only a measure of size — not a measure of power.

For India, the 2026 summit offers a chance to push BRICS toward the first possibility. The world will be watching not only who attends the summit in New Delhi, but what the expanded group is actually capable of doing together.